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Abstract
This study reports on a new false belief measure in a sample of 124 children and adolescents 
with or without high functioning autism (HFASD). In the classic paradigm, a participant predicts 
in which of two discrete locations a deceived protagonist will look for an object. In the current 
Sandbox task, the object is buried and reburied in a sandbox, thus creating a continuum between 
locations. Compared to typically developing individuals (n=62), those with HFASD (n=62) showed 
a larger egocentric bias on the Sandbox task. They failed to take the protagonist's false belief into 
account, despite their adequate ability to infer advanced mental states. This indicates that sensitive 
measures can reveal subtle first order Theory of Mind impairments in HFASD individuals.
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Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to ascribe mental states to others or to oneself and to explain 
and predict behaviour in terms of underlying mental states (Baron-Cohen, et al., 2000). The false 
belief task is the most widely used test to reveal ToM. This task measures children’s specific pre-
dictions of others’ actions under conditions of limited information, which indicates the ability to 
appreciate others’ mental states (Wimmer and Perner, 1983). Despite its many advantages, the 
classic false belief task is most appropriate for 3-6-year old children. This task is inappropriate for 
older children and adults due to ceiling effects in performance. Furthermore, the task’s dichoto-
mous nature is a limitation in that a participant either passes or fails. This categorical approach can 
miss the subtle variance in false belief reasoning at different ages, or across clinical groups 
(Bernstein, et al., 2007; Bernstein, et al., 2011). Indeed, increasing the number of response options 
results in a more sensitive measure in adults (Birch and Bloom, 2007). The current study highlights 
the use of a continuous false belief task. This task elicits subtle egocentric biases by measuring the 
extent to which participants can ignore or disregard their own beliefs in order to reason from an 
ignorant perspective on a continuous scale. We focus on children and adolescents with a diagnosis 
that impairs their false belief reasoning skills: Autism Spectrum Disorder.
A false belief task creates a situation in which participants find themselves more knowledgeable 
than another person. Consequently, researchers measure whether participants infer the mental state 
(e.g., a false belief about an object’s location) of the other person, also referred to as ‘first order 
false belief reasoning’. In the classic false belief task participants witness an object that is relocated 
in the absence of a protagonist. When the protagonist returns to the scene, participants indicate 
where the protagonist will look for the object. To predict the protagonist’s behaviour correctly, 
participants must ignore their own privileged knowledge about the actual situation and reason from 
the protagonist’s (false) perspective (Wimmer and Perner, 1983).
Typically developing children consistently fail false belief tasks until the age of four, while most 
six-year olds pass the task (Wellman, et al., 2001). This rapid shift in performance has led many 
developmental psychologists to hypothesise that children’s ToM development undergoes a stage-
like change in reasoning about mental states (Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Wellman, 1990). Before 
this conceptual change children do not appreciate the belief state of someone else, but explain the 
actions of someone else solely based on their own, egocentric knowledge of a situation (Moses and 
Flavell, 1990).
The term egocentrism is often used in its narrow sense, following Piaget, to refer to the ability 
to reconstruct the spatial perspective of another person. Here, we refer to the wider meaning of 
egocentrism, including the ability to take others’ mental states into account, which is often prob-
lematic for individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders (ASD; Begeer et al., 2010). ASD are 
characterized by impairments in verbal and nonverbal communication, which result in persistent 
social difficulties (APA, 2000). As opposed to young typically developing children who overcome 
their false belief failure, individuals with ASD fail false belief tasks well over the mental age of six 
years (Happé, 1995). They perform more poorly on false belief tasks than intellectually disabled 
individuals (Baron-Cohen, et al., 1985) or children with language impairment (Leslie and Frith, 
1988). However, from around 12 years of age individuals with ASD and normal IQ (high function-
ing ASD, HFASD) often show levels of false belief performance that are similar to typically devel-
oping children (Happé, 1995). Whether their mentalizing abilities are also similar to typically 
developing children is unclear.
Researchers have developed various measures to study more advanced ToM skills of individu-
als that pass the classic false belief tasks, but these measures yield inconsistent results. While ToM 
has many facets, the tasks most closely linked to the false belief paradigm purport to measure 
advanced ToM. In these advanced ToM tasks, participants reflect on mental states of story 
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characters during complex social interactions. Such tasks may require the inference of 
advanced mental states, ironic remarks, double bluff or faux pas. Children and adults with HFASD 
perform at both impaired (Happé, 1995; Kaland, et al., 2002; Spek, et al., 2010; White, 
et al., 2009) and normal levels compared to comparison groups (Roeyers, et al., 2001; Ponnet, 
et al., 2004; Senju, et al., 2009). The inconsistent results may relate to the variety of measures 
included in advanced ToM batteries. Additionally, various instruments focus on the ability to iden-
tify complex emotions from facial expressions (e.g., the ‘reading the mind in the eyes’ task, Baron-
Cohen, et al., 2001). However, again children and adults with HFASD do not consistently fail this 
task (see for instance: Spek, et al., 2010; Roeyers et al., 2001). Moreover, the extent to which the 
identification of facial expressions requires ToM understanding is unclear (Begeer, et al., 2008).
Implicit measures of false belief reasoning show specific problems in HFASD individuals. 
Adolescents with HFASD take more time to respond than typically developing adolescents 
(Kaland, et al., 2011). Moreover, adults with HFASD fail to attribute first order false beliefs spon-
taneously in their anticipatory looking behaviour (Senju, et al., 2009). Adults with HFASD also fail 
to employ their first order mindreading skills during a naturalistic interaction (Ponnet et al., 2004). 
However, they show these problems despite their adequate advanced conceptual reasoning skills 
on advanced ToM tasks.
While the above measures may capture the ToM impairments in HFASD individuals, these 
measures are of limited use in a clinical setting. Firstly, the results are inconsistent. Secondly, 
measures can be expensive and time-consuming, especially when responses must be filmed or 
analysed with eye-tracking technology. Consequently, there is a need for a simple measure that is 
sensitive enough to capture subtle false belief difficulties between individuals with HFASD or typi-
cal development who pass classic false belief tasks (see also Apperly, et al., 2011; Atance, et al., 
2010; Cohen and German, 2010).
Previous research showed that a more complex false belief task, with several response options 
and variation of the target object, highlights subtle impairments in the false belief reasoning of 
typically developing adults (Birch and Bloom, 2007). Further extending response options, research-
ers recently developed a “Sandbox” task to measure false belief reasoning on a continuum (Bernstein, 
et al., 2011; Sommerville, et al., submitted). Where the classic false belief task forces participants to 
choose between the original and the actual location of the object, the Sandbox task permits partici-
pants to choose between those two locations in a large rectangular box filled with Styrofoam pea-
nuts. Similar to the classic false belief task, a protagonist witnesses the object being buried in the 
first location. In the absence of the protagonist, the object itself (false belief condition), or an unre-
lated second object (no false belief condition) are relocated in the sandbox. In both conditions, the 
participant indicates where the protagonist will look for the object after his return. Importantly, 
participants can choose any location in the sandbox. The responses in the false belief and no false 
belief conditions depict the egocentric bias of the participant. Allowing participants to respond on a 
continuum permits us to capture more subtle egocentric biases. The dichotomous responses of the 
classic false belief task force the participant to choose between one of two alternatives. Thus the 
classic procedure may call to the participant’s attention the ignorant protagonist’s perspective. Using 
a continuous response option permits us to capture one’s unconscious egocentric bias, following 
social psychological approaches to adult egocentrism (e.g., Keysar, et al., 2003). Importantly, with 
these adaptations, the task can measure egocentric bias across the lifespan. To date, it has been used 
in typically developing preschoolers, adults, and the elderly (Bernstein, et al., 2011; Sommerville et 
al., submitted), but not in school-age children or individuals with autism.
In the current study we used the continuous false belief task in individuals with HFASD or typi-
cal development. We expected that the HFASD group would perform more poorly on the task than 
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an age-matched comparison group. We also administered a short selection of five advanced ToM 
tasks to compare performance on the continuous false belief task and advanced ToM tasks.
Method
Participants
After obtaining written parental consent, we included 124 children and adolescents (6-20 years), 
diagnosed with HFASD (n=62) and a typically developing comparison group (n=62; see Table 1 
for participant details). We included children and adolescents to test false belief reasoning across a 
wide age range. The HFASD diagnoses were based on assessments by psychiatrists or certified 
psychologists in accordance with DSM-IV criteria (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). The 
HFASD participants came from the Berg en Bosch school, an institution in Bilthoven, The 
Netherlands, specialized in education for children with autism. Children from the comparison 
group were matched on gender, chronological age and verbal ability and recruited from primary 
and high schools near Amsterdam, The Netherlands. They had no known history of developmental 
lag or disorders.
For the HFASD group, we assessed all participants with the Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule (ADOS, a play-based diagnostic measure that involves direct observation of the child; Lord, 
et al., 2000). Parents of both HFASD and comparison children completed the Social Responsiveness 
Scale (SRS, a parental observation scale; Constantino, et al., 2003; Roeyers, et al., 2009).
Participants completed the Dutch version of the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-NL 
(Schlichting, 2005; Dunn and Dunn, 2005), which is a receptive language test that correlates with 
overall intelligence (Bell, et al., 2001).
Materials & Procedure
Sandbox task.  We used a scaled-down version of the Sandbox Task (Bernstein et al., 2011; Som-
merville, et al., submitted), originally based on Wimmer and Perner’s (1983) classic false belief 
task. The interviewer, unaware of the experimental hypotheses, introduced the Sandbox task, using 
various pictures on a sheet of paper. Participants heard, “Here I have another task. It’s about a 
father and a daughter planting flower bulbs in a Sandbox. Listen carefully while I tell the story and 
if you like you may read along from the paper” (see Figure 1 for the false belief condition and 
Figure 2 for the no false belief condition). After reading the first part (false belief- or no false belief 
condition) the interviewer asked whether the participant had a good look at the pictures, then 
turned the paper around and continued reading the second part of the story (see Figure 3).
Table 1. Descriptive data (Means and SDs) of children and adolescents with high functioning autism 
disorder and typically developing children and adults
HFASD (n = 62) TD (n = 62)
Age in years  13.1 (3.1)  13.1 (3.2)
Gender: male/female 50/12 51/11
Receptive language ability: Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test, PPVT 107.4 (13.1) 107.7 (12.0)
Social Responsiveness Scale: SRSa  82.9 (19.4)  31.1 (11.8)
HFASD high functioning autism spectrum disorder, TD typically developing, SD standard deviation.
aSRS scores were obtained for 77% of the participants.
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We measured (in millimetres) the difference between the original hiding location of the flower 
bulb (0 mm) and the location where the participant indicated to look for the flower bulb. When 
participants indicated a location in the direction of the second hiding location of the flower bulb 
(63 mm) in the false belief version, or the stone (63 mm) in the no false belief version, this received 
Sanne and her dad go to bury flowerbulbs. Sanne’s dad buries a flowerbulb in the 
sandbox. In the picture you see where he buried the flowerbulb: at the location of the 
cross.
             0 mm* 
After that, Sanne’s dad goes to the barn to get a watering-can. In his absence Sanne 
decides to move the flowerbulb and bury it in a different location in the sandbox. 
              63 mm* 
Figure 1. First part of story and images in the false belief condition, as shown to participants.
* Measurement indicators were not printed on the actual task.
Sanne and her dad go to bury flowerbulbs. Sanne’s dad buries a flowerbulb in the 
sandbox. In the picture you see where he buried the flowerbulb: at the location of the 
cross.
             0 mm* 
After that, Sanne’s dad goes to the barn to get a watering-can. In his absence Sanne 
decides to bury a stone in a different location in the sandbox. 
              63 mm* 
Figure 2. First part of story and images in the no false belief condition, as shown to participants.
* Measurement indicators were not printed on the actual task.
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a positive bias score. When participants indicated a location in the opposite direction of the flower 
bulb or the stone, to the right of the original hiding location, this received a negative bias score. In 
addition to the false belief and no false belief scores, we computed a specific egocentric bias score 
for each participant, we subtracted the no false belief condition score from the false belief condi-
tion score. We counterbalanced the order in which participants completed the false belief and no 
false belief conditions. Order did not affect performance.
Advanced ToM task. There were five mental state stories, including a advanced false belief story 
(Birthday Puppy; Sullivan, et al., 1994), an emotional display rule story (Rollercoaster; Begeer 
et al., 2011), and the Double Bluff, Social Blunder and Irony vignettes of the Stories of everyday 
life (Kaland, et al., 2002). We chose these stories based on their high sensitivity for detecting group 
differences between individuals with and without HFASD. The experimenter read stories aloud. 
All stories described characters with diverse beliefs, false beliefs or the intention to create false 
beliefs in others. Participants predicted the understanding, emotion or behaviour of story characters 
on the basis of the characters’ mental states. In addition, participants inferred physical states from 
the story contexts of four of the stories. We counterbalanced physical and mental state questions, 
and combined these with various control and filler questions. All answers received pass or fail (1 
or 0) scores. We summed correct responses on the mental state and physical stories, and then con-
verted this to a proportion correct.
Results
First, we analysed the responses to the false belief and no false belief versions of the task sepa-
rately, using a 2 (Group: HFASD and comparison) * 2 (Belief: false belief and no false belief) 
repeated measures ANOVA, with Group as a between-subject factor and Belief as a within-subject 
factor. Expected main effects emerged for Group, F(1,122) = 4.00, p = .04, η2 = .03, and Belief, 
F(1,122) = 20.99, p < .001, partial η2 = .14. These effects were qualified by a Group*Belief interac-
tion, F(1,122) = 4.84, p = .03, partial η2 = .04. Two separate post-hoc one-way ANOVAs indicated 
that the false belief bias score was larger in the HFASD than the comparison group, F(1,122) = 
5.06, p = .03, partial η2 = .04, while no group differences appeared in the no false belief bias score.
Second, to show the specific patterns of egocentric bias in both groups more explicitly, we ana-
lysed the egocentric bias scores for each participant separately. Both groups showed significant 
egocentric bias scores, which deviated from 0 (HFASD: t(61) = 3.97, p < .001, η2 = .45; Comparison 
group: t(61)=2.29, p = .03, η2 = .28). Using ANOVA, we analyzed differences between the egocen-
tric bias scores of individuals with HFASD or typical development. The HFASD group showed a 
larger egocentric bias than the comparison group, F(1,122) = 4.84, p = .03, η2 = .04. Importantly, 
controlling for age and verbal ability showed the same results (main effect of Group, F(1,120) = 
When Sanne’s dad returns with the watering-can, where will he give water to the 
flowerbulb? Draw a cross on that spot. You’re allowed to draw only one cross. 
Figure 3. Second part of story and images in the false belief and no false belief condition, as shown to 
participants.
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4.79, p = .03, partial η2 = .04; Table 2). An additional analysis, adjusting outliers (>2 SD), but 
maintaining their distal-most ranking in the distribution (Bernstein et al., 2011; Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007), showed similar group differences in the false belief condition, F(1,122) = 4.09, p = 
.04, η2 = .03, but not in the no false belief condition, F(1,122) = .00, ns.
Third, to further analyse the number of children in both groups that showed the full egocentric 
error and pointed to the true location of the flower bulb in the false belief condition, we dichoto-
mized the scores in the false belief condition into scores below or within 10 mm of the actual loca-
tion of the flower bulb. Twelve participants with HFASD (19%) pointed to the true location in the 
false belief condition versus 3 participants from the control group (5%), χ2 = 6.14, p = .01, Φ = .55. 
In the no false belief condition, no group differences were found, and only one participant with 
HFASD pointed to the location of the distracting object (stone) χ2 = 1.00, p = .32.
We analyzed the performance on the advanced ToM task with a 2 (Group: HFASD and compari-
son) * 2 (Inference: mental state and physical state) repeated measures analysis of variance. No 
effect of Group or interaction effects between Group and Inference were found (maximum F = .84, 
minimum p = .36; see Table 2). The egocentric bias score (based on the subtraction of no false belief 
scores from the false belief scores) correlated with advanced ToM mental state reasoning scores, 
r(124) = -.18, p = .04. This correlation remained marginally significant after partialing out age and 
language ability, r(120) = -.15, p = .09. No correlations emerged between egocentric bias and physi-
cal state reasoning scores, autism severity, as indicated by the Social Responsiveness Scale, or the 
ADOS total score. While the Advanced ToM mental state reasoning scores increased with age r(124) 
= .26, p = .004, and, marginally with receptive language ability r(124) = .15, p = .09, the egocentric 
bias scores on the Sandbox task showed no correspondence with age or language ability.
Discussion
The current study compared the extent to which children and adolescents with and without HFASD 
exhibit egocentric bias on a first-order false belief task that we measured on a continuous scale (the 
Sandbox task), compared to a standard advanced ToM task. The Sandbox task significantly discrimi-
nated between those with and without HFASD, but the advanced ToM task did not. In the Sandbox 
task, participants with HFASD more often showed an egocentric response than did individuals from 
the comparison group. All participants witnessed an object being buried and reburied in two locations 
in a sandbox, in the absence of a protagonist. Individuals with HFASD incorrectly attributed to the 
unknowing story protagonist their own privileged knowledge of the object’s true location. This way 
they ignored the false belief of the protagonist, who was unaware of the true location.
The current study is the first to use a continuous measure of false belief reasoning in HFASD 
individuals. Although we found group differences, the effect sizes were relatively small compared 
Table 2. Means (SD) of False Belief, No False Belief and egocentric bias scores in mm and of proportions 
of mental and physical state inferences for HFASD and typically developing participants






HFASD (n=62) 11.00 (26.57) –2.65 (10.00) 13.65 (27.05) .70 (.22) .79 (23)
TD (n=62) 1.71 (18.75) –3.08 (8.67) 4.79 (16.50) .70 (.19) .82 (.19)
HFASD high functioning autism spectrum disorder, TD typically developing, SD standard deviation.
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to other studies using the Sandbox to delineate age differences in ToM development (Bernstein et 
al., 2011; Sommerville et al., submitted). One reason for this difference is that the two other studies 
included multiple trials and an actual container and toys. Children with HFASD might relate better 
to the real-life container, because it does not require them to imagine their response based on the 
drawing of a hypothetical Sandbox. Furthermore, the two previous Sandbox studies used a larger 
distance between the two hiding locations, and counterbalanced the hiding locations, possibly 
increasing the effect sizes obtained. Thus, while the current group differences indicate that the 
present task, which only takes 2 minutes, can be a promising instrument targeting first order ToM 
in adolescents and adults, we need to develop the current methodology in a more elaborate and 
sensitive tool that can be used in clinical practice.
Earlier studies on ASD reported correlations between IQ and ToM skills (see Begeer et al., 2010 
for an overview). The current results did not confirm this. This may be due to the nature of the cur-
rent sample, which included high functioning children and adolescents, which often report fewer 
symptoms on the ADOS and SRS. It would be worthwhile to repeat the current study using younger 
or cognitively delayed children with ASD.
A shortcoming of the classic false belief task is its dichotomous nature. In this task, partici-
pants either pass or fail the task. Consequently, the researcher concludes that some individuals 
understand false belief and others do not, respectively. By extension, this conclusion indicates 
that false belief understanding follows stage-like development. In the current study, we found 
an age-related increase in advanced ToM performance in both HFASD and typically develop-
ing groups. This indicates that advanced ToM reasoning continues to develop through late 
childhood and adolescence, irrespective of an autism diagnosis. In contrast, we found no age-
related increase in performance on the Sandbox task, a first-order false belief task, in either 
the HFASD or the typically developing groups. This shows the value of the Sandbox task in 
the assessment of subtle ToM skills in adolescents. Their performance does not increase with 
age, indicating that they also show subtle egocentric responses during adolescence, and pos-
sibly as adults. The age-related increase in conceptual, advanced ToM reasoning can be linked 
with an understanding of other minds that improves with age, independently from natural 
mindreading skills. Some additional evidence for a cognitive mediation of advanced ToM 
skills was found in the near significant correlation between language ability and advanced 
ToM mental state reasoning score.
Because even typically developing adolescents and adults appear to have difficulties with 
false beliefs (Keysar, et al., 2003; Birch and Bloom, 2007), some maintain that there is a more 
generic egocentric bias in all human beings (Epley, et al., 2004; Nickerson, 1999). Conversely, 
it is possible that individuals with HFASD do have a concept of mental representations. 
However, compared to typically developing individuals, their relatively stronger egocentric 
bias hampers their perspective taking performance. This means that the perspective taking 
problems of individuals with HFASD do not reflect a lack of ToM but rather a weakness inhibit-
ing an egocentric perspective (Epley, et al., 2004). An executive failure in top-down processing 
likely prevents those with HFASD from benefitting from their intact understanding of mental 
state concepts.
As suggested by our findings, the capacity to reason correctly about false beliefs continues to 
develop in both HFASD and typically developing individuals. However, different developmental 
trajectories of underlying executive competence may be an important driving force behind the 
ToM problems that HFASD individuals encounter in real life interactions, despite their adequate 
conceptual skills (Apperly et al., 2011). Further investigations should delineate these developmen-
tal trajectories in children with ASD.
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